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Abstract
Background: With the recognition that public hospitals are often productively inefficient, reforms
have taken place worldwide to increase their administrative autonomy and financial responsibility.
Reforms in China have been some of the most radical: the government budget for public hospitals
was fixed, and hospitals had to rely on charges to fill their financing gap. Accompanying these
changes was the widespread introduction of performance-related pay for hospital doctors –
termed the "bonus" system. While the policy objective was to improve productivity and cost
recovery, it is likely that the incentive to increase the quantity of care provided would operate
regardless of whether the care was medically necessary.
Methods: The primary concerns of this study were to assess the effects of the bonus system on
hospital revenue, cost recovery and productivity, and to explore whether various forms of bonus
pay were associated with the provision of unnecessary care. The study drew on longitudinal data
on revenue and productivity from six panel hospitals, and a detailed record review of 2303 tracer
disease patients (1161 appendicitis patients and 1142 pneumonia patients) was used to identify
unnecessary care.
Results: The study found that bonus system change over time contributed significantly to the
increase in hospital service revenue and hospital cost recovery. There was an increase in
unnecessary care and in the probability of admission when the bonus system switched from one
with a weaker incentive to increase services to one with a stronger incentive, suggesting that
improvement in the financial health of public hospitals was achieved at least in part through the
provision of more unnecessary care and drugs and through admitting more patients.
Conclusion: There was little evidence that the performance-related pay system as designed by the
sample of Chinese public hospitals was socially desirable. Hospitals should be monitored more
closely by the government, and regulations applied to limit opportunistic behaviour. Otherwise, the
containment of government financing for public facilities may result in an increase in the provision
of unnecessary care, an increase in health costs to society, and a waste in social resources.
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Background
Health policy researchers and policy makers have increas-
ingly recognized that health care providers have a power-
ful influence on health care provision and the use of
health care resources. With the recognition that public
hospitals are often productively inefficient, reforms have
taken place worldwide to increase the administrative
autonomy and financial responsibility of public hospitals
[1,2]. Reforms in China are perhaps some of the most rad-
ical. Starting from the early 1980s, the government budget
for public hospitals was fixed, and hospitals had to rely on
charges to fill the gap between hospital expenditure and
income from the government. Medical prices regulated by
government were increased and hospitals allowed to earn
profits from certain services and from drugs. Accompany-
ing these changes was the widespread introduction of per-
formance-related pay for hospital doctors – termed the
"bonus" system. The policy objective was to improve pro-
ductivity and cost recovery [3].
The bonus system is widespread and used by almost all
hospitals in China. The types of hospital bonus system
can be summarized into three different forms: flat bonus,
quantity-related bonus and revenue-related bonus [4-12].
A flat bonus is distributed among hospital staff equally or
almost equally, with the amount depending on the over-
all financial status of the hospital. A quantity-related
bonus is paid according to the quantity of services pro-
vided (visits, admissions, inpatient days, medical proce-
dures, and tests and examinations), usually with a
quantity target above which the bonus is paid. A revenue-
related bonus depends on the revenue generated by doc-
tors through provision of services and drugs over a reve-
nue target.
A survey of bonus systems in all county hospitals in Shan-
dong province in 1997 [13] found that 78% had a reve-
nue-related system and the remaining 22% a quantity-
related system. The average bonus per month (83 yuan)
was around 10% of the monthly salary but depended on
the financial status of the hospital. In 1997, 11% of hos-
pitals paid no bonus, and 37% paid an average bonus of
over 100 yuan per month. Average bonus amounts were
not significantly different by type of bonus system.
The objectives of the study reported here were to assess the
effects of the bonus system on hospital revenue, cost
recovery and productivity, and to explore whether bonus
pay was associated with the provision of unnecessary care.
The primary hypothesis tested in the study was that the
impact of a bonus system on revenue, cost recovery, pro-
ductivity and unnecessary care would depend on the
strength and direction of the economic incentive of differ-
ent bonus systems, and doctors' responses to these incen-
tives. It was assumed that an increase in provision of
necessary care would provide utility gains for doctors in
the form of income and a utility loss in the form of greater
effort, and that the provision of unnecessary care would
also provide income utility gains, but at a utility loss stem-
ming from ethical concerns as well as greater effort. Thus
the behaviour of doctors would be determined by the
trade-off of utility gains and losses, and the motivation for
doctors to provide unnecessary care would be constrained
by their desire for leisure and for ethical behaviour.
It was hypothesized that a flat bonus might motivate doc-
tors to provide necessary care but would be less likely to
motivate them to provide unnecessary care. If there is
enough demand, the effort of an individual doctor to pro-
vide more necessary care would benefit patients, the hos-
pital and the doctor as well. Productivity, cost recovery
and quality of care could all improve. If there is insuffi-
cient demand, the doctor could induce demand but might
be less motivated to do so because the bonus income
would be distributed throughout the hospital. A quantity-
related bonus would provide a stronger economic incen-
tive for doctors to provide a greater quantity of services,
and might help to improve productivity, cost recovery and
quality of care if there is sufficient demand. But when
demand is insufficient, doctors may be motivated to
induce demand by providing more care, regardless of
need. What types of service would be overprovided would
depend on how quantity is defined and measured.
Finally, a revenue-related bonus provides the strongest
incentive for doctors to induce patient demand for both
services and drugs.
Methods
Definition and measurement of key indicators
Productivity is generally defined as the ratio of a hospital's
output to its input. This study employed both unidimen-
sional ratio analysis (outpatient visits per doctor, admis-
sions per doctor, bed occupancy rate, length of stay); and
Data Envelopment Analysis, a linear programming
method that measures the technical efficiency of produc-
tion [14] and has been used to measure hospital produc-
tivity by numerous authors (e.g. [15]). The relative level of
hospital productivity was indicated by the DEA efficiency
score, which ranges from 0 to 100, with, for a given set of
inputs, 0 meaning no output and 100 meaning the maxi-
mization of output. The objective function of hospital o
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where o represents the hospital being evaluated in the set
of j = 1,...,n hospitals; E is the efficiency score; ur is the
weight for the rth output; yro is the rth output for the oth
hospital; s is the number of outputs; vi is the weight of the
ith input; xio is the ith input for the oth hospital; m is the
number of inputs. The DEA efficiency score was calculated
using software developed by Warwick Business School
[16], assuming constant returns to scale. Hospital inputs
included the number of doctors, the number of nurses,
the monetary value of hospital fixed assets, the number of
hospital beds and the monetary value of supplies. The
hospital outputs included the number of admissions, out-
patient visits and surgical operations.
Cost recovery was defined as service revenue expressed as
a percentage of recurrent and total costs. Unnecessary care
was defined as services and drugs provided that were
judged by a panel of doctors to lead to no improvement
in patient outcomes. Unnecessary care can be assessed
only in relation to the nature of the cases being treated, so
appendicitis and child pneumonia were selected as tracer
diseases on the basis that they were common so there were
enough cases for each hospital and year; they had clear-cut
diagnoses so the sample would be homogeneous; and
both had a standard plan of treatment, so variation in
treatment would not be due to treatment uncertainty. Six
surgeons (for appendicitis cases) and six paediatricians
(for pneumonia cases) worked together with the investi-
gators to develop guidelines for appropriate management
of the two tracer diseases and for identification of unnec-
essary care. These guidelines were positive lists of types
and quantities of services and drugs necessary for the
improvement of the health outcomes of patients. The
unnecessary care indicator was unnecessary care expendi-
ture as a percent of total expenditure. A detailed descrip-
tion of the methodology is in Liu and Mills [17].
Samples and data
Based on a census of all 127 county general hospitals in
Shandong province [18], 25 hospitals were selected that
had experienced change of bonus system and that had
complete inpatient files for the previous 10 years. These
hospitals were categorized into three groups based on
county income level, and two hospitals randomly selected
from each group. Data were collected from these six panel
hospitals for the period 1978–1997 on the type of bonus
system in different years; total revenue by source; recur-
rent and capital cost; staff numbers; and activity data (out-
patients, inpatients, operations, CT scans, average length
of stay, bed occupancy rate).
Inpatient records were collected from the six panel hospi-
tals for each change of bonus system and encompassing
the year of the switch and the two years before and after.
Table 1: Bonus systems of the six panel hospitals (1978 – 1997)
Year Zhaoyuan Liangshan Qixia Weishan Changyi Yanzhou
1 9 7 8 111111
1 9 7 9 111 1 * 11
1980 1 1 1* 1* 1 1
1981 1 1 1* 2* 1 1
1982 1 1 2* 2* 1 1*
1983 1 1 2* 2* 1 1*
1984 1 1 2* 2 2 2*
1985 1 1232 2*
1986 11232 2*
1987 212322
1988 222322
1989 222322
1990 2 2 2322
1991 222322
1992 222322
1993 323122
1994 333133
1995 333333
1996 3 3 3 333
1997 3 3 3 3 33
Notes:
1) 1: No bonus; 2: Flat bonus; 3: Revenue-related.
2) Numbers in italics indicate years for which inpatient records were collected.
3) * indicates data on tracer diseases were not available around the years of the bonus switch.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:11 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/11
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Inpatient records for each year, disease and hospital were
drawn from the beginning of the year until the sample size
reached 30 or until there were no more records available.
Altogether the study included 1161 appendicitis patients
and 1142 pneumonia patients.
Patient files were randomly distributed to the relevant
doctors who reviewed the files and recorded the types and
quantities of services and drugs actually used, and the
types and quantities of unnecessary services and drugs. If
the removal of unnecessary items was considered to result
in inadequate treatment, substitute necessary services and
drugs were added in. Finally, actual expenditures and
unnecessary expenditures were computed by accountants
according to the 1997 provincial fee schedule.
Because of the burden of work, each record was reviewed
by only one doctor, but to check for consistency, 61
patient records for appendicitis and 57 for pneumonia
were selected and randomly distributed to the panel doc-
tors for re-reviews, without their knowledge, and the
results compared. Means were very similar: none of the ps
of t-tests were less than 0.05 and most were very close to 1.
Data analysis
In the data analysis, we first described the historical
changes in bonus system, hospital revenue, productivity
and cost recovery, and then analysed the level of unneces-
sary care.
Trend analysis was performed to examine the changes in
hospital revenue, cost recovery, productivity, and the rate
of unnecessary expenditure following the bonus switches.
In the trend analysis, the indicators were assessed for a
continuous five years for each of the hospital bonus
switches, including the year of bonus switch and the two
years before and the two years after the switch.
In correlation and regression analysis, we examined the
relationships of the bonus system with the four key varia-
bles (hospital revenue, cost recovery, hospital productiv-
ity and unnecessary care). First, the interrelationships
among these four variables were examined through corre-
lation analysis of each pair of variables. The observation
units were hospital-years. The type of bonus was meas-
ured by a dummy variable with values reflecting the
expected strength of economic incentives to overprovide
(non-bonus = 1; flat bonus = 2; revenue-related bonus =
3). Cost recovery was measured by the rate of recovery of
Table 2: Changes in average activity levels of the panel hospitals, 1978 – 1997
Year Change in 
revenue 
(1975 = 100)
Recovery of 
recurrent cost 
(%)
Change in the number of: (1975 = 100)
Admissions Visits Operations No. of visits per 
admission
1978 100 75.4 100 100 100 31.7
1979 124 79.3 111 102 103 29.3
1980 132 79.3 123 105 116 27.1
1981 140 82.0 124 106 114 27.2
1982 155 82.1 104 108 118 32.9
1983 168 80.3 110 105 122 30.3
1984 206 77.9 106 112 131 33.4
1985 206 73.3 108 111 120 32.4
1986 270 82.7 119 115 141 30.6
1987 341 89.1 138 121 161 27.9
1988 436 97.8 149 120 181 25.6
1989 525 104.9 161 112 196 22.0
1990 634 101.4 160 113 202 22.5
1991 728 93.8 171 120 220 22.3
1992 839 98.3 149 115 218 24.6
1993 1,046 100.2 157 97 245 19.6
1994 1,063 90.8 158 85 254 17.0
1995 1,280 99.4 172 83 265 15.2
1996 1,552 104.1 185 90 268 15.4
1997 1,755 102.0 201 91 283 14.3Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:11 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/11
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recurrent cost, and hospital productivity by the DEA effi-
ciency score.
The subsequent set of analyses used stepwise regression
analysis to examine whether and how hospital revenue,
cost recovery, unnecessary care and productivity were
related to each other, and to what extent they were
explained by the bonus system. Each of the four variables
was taken in turn as a dependent variable, and the factors
that might explain the variations in the dependent varia-
ble examined (the results of the four stepwise regression
analyses yielded results similar to a general regression
analysis in terms of R-squares and statistical significance
levels of the independent variables). Besides indicators of
revenue, cost recovery, unnecessary care and productivity,
the year, names of hospitals and bonus type were put into
the regression models as independent variables. The six
hospital names were arranged into five dummy variables.
The year measured all the factors that changed with time
(e.g. medical price inflation, technology improvement
and the increase in demand for care). The names of hos-
pitals measured all the factors that were related to each
hospital (e.g. the level of demand faced by an individual
hospital, management capacity, degree of observance of
ethical codes, etc.).
Results
Historical changes in bonus system, hospital revenue, 
productivity and cost recovery
All six panel hospitals had experienced bonus switches
from no-bonus to flat-bonus and then to revenue-related
bonus (Table 1). None had experience of quantity-related
bonus. Before the early 1980s, no hospital had a bonus
system; by 1988 all hospitals had a flat bonus system; and
by the middle of the 1990s, all hospitals had a revenue-
related bonus system.
Coinciding with the change in bonus systems, over the
period 1978–97, there was a remarkable increase in hos-
pital revenue, an increase in hospital cost recovery, a dou-
bling of admissions, a decrease in visits and a tripling of
operations (Table 2). The average revenue increase in real
terms was 16.3% per year, and 3.7% per year for admis-
sions. In 1978, only 3% of outpatients were admitted into
hospital and only 17% of inpatients were operated on,
while by 1997 these had increased to 7% and 25%. Staff
numbers and hospital beds increased over time and
because the increase in inputs exceeded the increase in
outputs, most productivity indicators decreased (Table 3)
with the exception of operations per doctor. Quality
changes might have occurred but could not be assessed
with the available data.
Unnecessary expenditure
There was a large amount of unnecessary expenditure for
both tracer diseases. The average expenditure (1997
prices) for an appendicitis patient was 774 yuan (USD
Table 3: Changes in productivity in the panel hospitals, 1978 – 1997
Year Bed occupancy 
rate (%)
Length of stay 
(days)
Visits per 
doctor
Admissions per 
doctor
Operations per 
doctor
DEA efficiency 
score
1978 86 9.1 2041 64.3 11.3 97.1
1979 91 9.0 1955 68.7 10.9 97.1
1980 88 9.0 1893 72.0 11.5 96.9
1981 90 9.2 1712 64.0 10.2 95.6
1982 89 10.0 1660 51.2 9.8 87.9
1983 90 10.2 1561 52.0 9.8 86.5
1984 87 10.5 1480 43.5 9.6 84.8
1985 91 10.7 1374 41.9 8.2 74.7
1986 94 11.3 1378 44.9 9.3 79.5
1987 93 11.2 1289 44.6 9.0 77.0
1988 95 11.1 1297 48.4 10.5 75.2
1989 92 11.3 1063 45.6 9.9 77.1
1990 94 11.8 1066 45.1 10.3 74.9
1991 92 11.1 1165 50.3 11.6 78.9
1992 88 12.2 1019 39.6 10.4 76.2
1993 86 11.7 839 40.9 11.4 75.1
1994 79 11.3 720 40.2 11.3 74.8
1995 82 10.8 675 42.2 11.4 74.7
1996 82 10.2 689 44.2 11.1 73.5
1997 79 10.6 684 48.2 11.8 72.6Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:11 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/11
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95), of which 18% was considered unnecessary. For a
pneumonia patient these figures were 559 yuan (USD 68)
and 19%. Further analyses showed that more than one
third of the expenditure for drugs was deemed unneces-
sary for both appendicitis (38%) and pneumonia (34%),
and this made up 49% (appendicitis) and 73% (pneumo-
nia) of total unnecessary expenditure. Unnecessary
expenditure for doctors' and nurses' services, associated
with excessive lengths of stay, made up the second largest
share of unnecessary expenditure, accounting for 43%
(appendicitis) and 21% (pneumonia). In terms of
expenditure for doctors' and nurses' services, 13% (appen-
dicitis) and 9% (pneumonia) of this was unnecessary.
Although more than 50% of the expenditure for examina-
tions for appendicitis patients was unnecessary, it made
up only about 1% of the total unnecessary expenditure
since little was spent on examinations. Unnecessary
expenditure for laboratory tests was small in terms of both
its contribution to total unnecessary expenditure (1%),
and its percentage of expenditure for tests (7%).
The relationship of bonus switch to hospital revenue, cost 
recovery, productivity and unnecessary care: trend analysis
The above data show that there had been considerable
changes over time in hospital revenue and productivity,
and also that there was a considerable amount of unnec-
essary care. But were these features related? This section
examines this question through analysis of trends; the
subsequent section examines the question through corre-
lation and regression analysis.
Table 4 summarizes the changes in key indicators by hos-
pital and type of bonus switch. When three hospitals
changed their bonus system from non-bonus to flat
bonus:
• the rate of growth of revenue increased in all three;
• cost recovery increased in all three;
• two hospitals out of three showed a decrease in the vis-
its/admission ratio, meaning that more patients were
admitted out of those attending for outpatient care;
• one hospital out of three showed a decrease in the
admissions/operation ratio, meaning that a higher share
of inpatients were operated on;
• productivity decreased in all three;
• unnecessary care increased in two out of three.
When hospitals conducted a further switch from flat
bonus to revenue-related bonus:
• all six hospitals increased their rate of growth of revenue
• the majority (4/6) showed a decrease in cost recovery
• all six hospitals showed a decrease in the visits/admis-
sion ratio
• all six hospitals showed a decrease in the admissions/
operation ratio
• five of the six hospitals experienced increases in
productivity
• half showed an increase in unnecessary care.
Table 4: Changes in revenue, cost recovery, productivity and unnecessary care with changes in bonus system
Name of 
hospital
Rate of change 
of revenue
Rate of cost 
recovery
Visits per 
admission
Admissions per 
operation
DEA efficiency 
score
Rate of 
unnecessary 
care
Switch from non bonus to flat bonus
Zhaoyuan Increase Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase
Liangshan Increase* Increase* Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease
Changyi Increase Increase* Increase Decrease Decrease Increase
Switch from flat to revenue-related bonus
Zhaoyuan Increase Increase Decrease Decrease Increase Increase
Liangshan Increase* Increase* Decrease Decrease Decrease Decrease
Qixia Increase Decrease Decrease Decrease Increase No change
Changyi Increase Decrease Decrease Decrease Increase Increase
Yanzhou Increase Increase Decrease Decrease Increase Decrease
Weishan Increase Increase Decrease Decrease Increase Increase
Switch from revenue-related to flat bonus
Weishan Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease DecreaseHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:11 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/11
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Despite some inconsistent results, likely to reflect loca-
tion-specific factors, an overall pattern emerges. First, the
implementation of a flat bonus where previously there
had been no bonus system seemed to be associated with
an increase in hospital revenue and cost recovery, a
decrease in hospital productivity and an increase in
unnecessary care. Second, the implementation of a reve-
nue-related bonus following a flat bonus system appeared
to have increased hospital revenue and cost recovery,
encouraged higher admissions and operations rates, and
increased hospital productivity, with an unclear effect on
unnecessary care.
The interrelationships among bonus system, hospital 
revenue, cost recovery, productivity and unnecessary care
Results of correlation analysis (the correlation coefficients
and their p values for the null hypothesis that the correla-
tion coefficients are zero) are shown in Table 5. Bonus
type was negatively correlated with DEA efficiency score (p
< 0.01) but positively correlated with unnecessary care (p
< 0.05), with service revenue (p < 0.01) and the rate of cost
recovery (p < 0.01). These results mean that with a change
in the bonus payment from non-bonus to flat bonus and
to revenue-related bonus, hospital revenue increased and
cost recovery improved. However, the improvement in
financial status was associated with reductions in hospital
productivity and increase in unnecessary care.
The negative correlations between hospital productivity
and cost recovery (p < 0.01) and hospital productivity and
hospital revenue (p < 0.01) are consistent with the previ-
ous trend analysis, which showed an increase in cost
recovery (and revenue) but a decrease in hospital produc-
tivity over time. Reduction in hospital productivity may
have resulted from increased competition between pro-
viders, which encouraged county hospitals to provide
more drugs and services per patient and to charge them
more in order to increase revenue, and/or the increasing
cost may have deterred people from seeking care.
Hospital productivity and unnecessary care were nega-
tively correlated (p < 0.05). This relationship implies that
if hospitals provide less unnecessary care and the expend-
iture of patients is therefore less, the hospital will be able
to attract more patients. This is theoretically as expected
because reduction in price will lead to increase in patient
demand.
The relationships were not statistically significant between
unnecessary care and hospital revenue, and unnecessary
care and cost recovery (p > 0.05 for both). Individual hos-
Table 5: Correlations among bonus system, productivity, cost recovery and unnecessary care
Type of bonus Efficiency score Service revenue Cost recovery
Efficiency score -0.4075
(0.001)
Service revenue 0.7353 -0.2952
(0.001) (0.001)
Cost recovery 0.3002 -0.2559 0.3328
(0.009) (0.005) (0.0002)
Unnecessary care 0.3502 -0.2989 0.2374 0.0534
(0.012) (0.035) (0.0969) (0.7128)
Sample sizes: n = 50 for the correlation with unnecessary care; for all the others n = 120
Table 6: Factors explaining the variation in hospital revenue (n = 50)
Variable Parameter estimate F P Partial R**2 Model R**2
INTERCEP -99 008 144 63.24 0.0001
Year 1 080 386 56.76 0.0001 0.7084 0.7084
Weishan -4 029 314 13.42 0.0007 0.0708 0.7792
Bonus type 1 887 830 17.38 0.0001 0.0577 0.8369
Qixia 3 540 575 7.68 0.0082 0.0168 0.8357
DEA score 58 905 3.21 0.0800 0.0100 0.8636
Unnecessary care (not selected at P = 0.15 level)
Model: F = 55.73 P = 0.0001 R2 = 0.8636Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:11 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/11
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pital analysis showed that when the bonus switched from
non-bonus to flat bonus or from flat bonus to revenue-
related bonus, both unnecessary care and cost recovery
tended to increase. In theory, there should indeed be a
positive relationship between unnecessary care and hospi-
tal cost recovery. The reason why the relationship was not
statistically significant may be explained by the sample
size (only 50 hospital years for the correlation analysis
with unnecessary care) and large variations in both unnec-
essary care and rates of cost recovery.
Table 6 shows the stepwise regression results for hospital
revenue. The fitted model was statistically significant at
the p < 0.001 level and could explain 86% of the total var-
iation in hospital revenue (R2 = 0.8636). Bonus type was
selected into the model and was statistically significant (p
< 0.01), explaining about 6% of the total variation in hos-
pital service revenue. On average, as the parameter esti-
mate shows, a switch to a bonus system with an expected
stronger economic incentive increased hospital revenue
by about two million yuan. The DEA efficiency score was
not statistically significant and the unnecessary care indi-
cator was not even selected into the model at the level of
p = 0.15, implying that the relationship between revenue
and productivity and the relationship between revenue
and unnecessary care (as shown in the correlation analy-
sis) are in fact the effect of the bonus type. In other words,
bonus type may have affected hospital revenue through
increases in hospital productivity and unnecessary care.
As the partial R2 shows, the year, which was selected with
p = 0.0001, explained 70% of the total variation in hospi-
tal revenue. This is not surprising, given the change in rev-
enue over time described earlier. The two hospital dummy
variables jointly explained 9% of the revenue variation.
These results imply that a dominant proportion of the rev-
enue variation among years and hospitals can be
explained by factors related to time and individual hospi-
tal characteristics. Although bonus type mattered, it could
explain only a small portion of the variation.
Table 7 shows the stepwise regression results for rate of
recovery of recurrent cost. The model was statistically sig-
nificant (p < 0.001) with an R2 of 0.6084. As with the
regression on hospital revenue, the DEA efficiency score
and unnecessary care were not selected into the model at
the p = 0.15 level, and the bonus type was selected with a
p value of 0.0129. The bonus type explained more than
3% of the variation in the rate of cost recovery, and on
average a bonus switch to one with an expected stronger
Table 7: Factors explaining the variation in hospital cost recovery (n = 50)
Variable Parameter estimate F P Partial R**2 Model R**2
INTERCEP 50.4365 1.58 0.2147
Changyi -24.1669 28.67 0.0001 0.1880 0.1880
Zhaoyuan -19.2626 18.93 0.0001 0.1370 0.3250
Qixia -23.7887 21.40 0.0001 0.1486 0.4736
Liangshan -9.9650 5.87 0.0196 0.0818 0.5554
Bonus type 2.1861 6.38 0.0129 0.0306 0.5860
Year 0.6534 2.34 0.1336 0.0224 0.6084
DEA score (not selected at p = 0.15 level)
Unnecessary care (not selected at p = 0.15 level)
Model: F = 12.04 p = 0.0001 R2 = 0.6084
Table 8: Factors explaining the variation in unnecessary care (n = 50)
_Variable Parameter estimate F P Partial R**2 Model R**2
INTERCEP 79.7257 2298.21 0.0001
Liangshan -5.3433 13.05 0.0007 0.1629 0.1629
Zhaoyuan -3.6315 5.52 0.0232 0.1161 0.2790
Bonus type 1.0492 4.04 0.0582 0.0582 0.3372
Year (not selected at p = 0.15 level)
DEA score (not selected at p = 0.15 level)
Model: F = 7.80 P = 0.0003 R2 = 0.3371Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:11 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/11
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economic incentive contributed a two percentage-point
increase to the rate of cost recovery. In contrast to the
regression on hospital revenue, the year variable was no
longer statistically significant and a dominant proportion
(55%) of the variation in the rate of cost recovery was
explained by hospital characteristics.
Table 8 shows the stepwise regression results for unneces-
sary care. The model was statistically significant (p < 0.01)
and the R2 of the model was 0.3371. Bonus type was
selected as a significant factor (p = 0.05) with a partial R2
of 0.058, meaning that the difference in bonus system
explained about 6% of the variation in unnecessary care.
As the parameter shows, with a change in bonus type from
non-bonus to flat or from flat bonus to revenue-related
bonus, the unnecessary care indicator increased by about
one percentage point – not as much as had been expected.
After controlling for bonus type and hospital characteris-
tics, the year and DEA efficiency score were not selected as
significant factors explaining the difference in unneces-
sary care. The difference in characteristics of individual
hospitals explained 27% of the total difference in unnec-
essary care and more than 60% of the variance was unex-
plained by this model.
Table 9 shows the stepwise regression results for hospital
productivity. The fitted model was statistically significant
(p  < 0.001) with an R2of 0.35. Unnecessary care was
selected as a significant factor affecting hospital productiv-
ity, and the difference in unnecessary care explained 8.6%
of the total variation in hospital productivity. A decrease
in unnecessary care was associated with an increase in
hospital productivity. This finding, and the fact that the
DEA efficiency score was not selected as a significant fac-
tor explaining the difference in unnecessary care, imply
that the relationship between unnecessary care and hospi-
tal productivity is such that the increase in unnecessary
care reduced hospital productivity, rather than that the
reduction in hospital productivity forced hospitals to pro-
vide more unnecessary care. Bonus type in this model was
not found to be a significant factor, suggesting that the
historical reduction in hospital productivity was not
caused by switches in bonus system and that bonus
switches failed to improve hospital productivity.
Although the descriptive data showed that hospital pro-
ductivity fell over time, year was not statistically signifi-
cant in this model.
Discussion
Given the absence of computerized information systems,
this study was constrained by what data could feasibly be
collected by hand. In particular this limited the study of
unnecessary care, which was extremely time-consuming.
If inpatient records had covered more years and more
hospital years had been employed in the regression anal-
yses, the factors that were not significant might have been
statistically significant, and the goodness of fit of the mod-
els might have improved. Moreover, only two tracer
conditions were studied, and only inpatient care was
assessed. These conditions allow for only a limited degree
of overprovision, especially in terms of lab tests and drugs,
and so are likely to have underestimated the amount of
unnecessary care.
Productivity assessment, for both unidimensional ratio
analysis and DEA, had two major shortcomings: changes
in the quality of care (other than the component of unnec-
essary care) were ignored, and changes in case mix were
not adjusted for. Over time it is likely that the quality of
care improved, and that case mix changed; thus this study
is likely to have exaggerated the degree to which produc-
tivity declined over time. However, these points do not
necessarily affect the finding that there was a lack of a sta-
tistically significant relationship between bonus type and
hospital productivity. It is possible that hospital expan-
sion and increased numbers of staff per hospital may have
obscured any increase in quantity stimulated by the bonus
payment.
Table 9: Factors explaining the variation in hospital productivity (n = 50)
Variable Parameter estimate F P Partial R**2 Model R**2
INTERCEP -55.8719 1.08 0.3038
Year -0.7421 2.89 0.0959 0.1075 0.1075
Unnecessary care 0.7010 4.10 0.0489 0.0859 0.1934
Zhaoyuan 14.6042 11.64 0.0014 0.0930 0.2864
Liangshan 6.2018 2.18 0.1468 0.0337 0.3201
Changyi 15.4109 12.83 0.0008 0.0321 0.3522
Bonus type (not selected at p = 0.15 level)
Model: F = 12.05, P = 0.0001, R2 = 0.3522Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:11 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/11
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The effect of bonus payment is likely to depend on both
the type and the amount of bonus. However, data on the
amount of bonus was a sensitive question, and panel hos-
pitals either refused to provide data or provided data that
were not considered reliable. In a related hospital census
survey [18], it was found that there was no statistically sig-
nificant difference in the average amount of bonus per
doctor across the types of bonus. However, the variation
of bonus payment among hospital doctors increased with
the progression of bonus types. These findings suggest
that exclusion of bonus amount in the analysis may not
have introduced much error, because the average amount
did not vary much, and it was the way in which the bonus
was distributed that mattered.
In the analyses of individual hospitals and of trends, it
was found that for some hospitals, the changes in indica-
tors happened in the year of switch and for others the fol-
lowing year. There are two possible reasons. First, when
hospitals responded to the bonus switch would depend
on whether the bonus switch happened early or late in the
year. Second, the speed of effects would also depend on
how hospitals responded. Some may have responded
quickly by admitting more patients, providing more exist-
ing services and prescribing more and costlier drugs. Oth-
ers may have had to wait for the purchase of equipment
(e.g. CT scanner) or the training of personnel (e.g. for
open-heart surgery).
It was clear from the analysis that the increase in hospital
cost recovery was not a result of improvement in hospital
productivity, since between 1978 and 1997, cost recovery
increased from 71% to 96% and the DEA efficiency score
decreased from 97% to 73%. Apart from the increase in
the proportion of unnecessary expenditure and the bonus
system changes, there are at least four additional factors
that may have affected the increase in hospital cost
recovery.
First, over the previous 20 years the Chinese government
had been raising medical care prices. Although these on
average were set at about 50% of total cost [19], prices
were higher relative to their cost than 10 years previously.
Second, due to the liberalization of the pharmaceutical
market, the prices of drugs had increased considerably,
doubling from 1980 to 1990 [8]. This benefited hospitals,
because they were allowed to sell drugs at a 20% mark-up.
Third, the development of new technologies encouraged
the introduction of new treatments and drugs that usually
had much higher regulated prices than traditional treat-
ments and drugs. For example, before 1980, imported
drugs accounted for less than 1% of the Chinese drug mar-
ket, while by 1993 the sale of imported drugs made up
30%–55% of the market in major cities such as Beijing
and Shanghai [20]. Before 1980 there was no CT or MRI
in China, while by 1995, CT scanners had became very
popular in county hospitals and MRI could be found in
any city at and above the prefecture level. Because the
prices of high technology services could be set above cost,
and the prices for the new imported drugs were 5 to 10
times the prices of the traditional and domestic drugs,
hospitals obtained much more profit from using these
services and drugs.
Finally, government budget reform increased the financial
accountability of public hospitals. Reducing waste and
saving costs became a major management concern, help-
ing to improve hospital cost recovery. However, this study
suggests that hospital characteristics explained around
55% of the variation in hospital cost recovery, implying
that hospital management capacity and ability to control
cost varied a great deal.
Between 1978 and 1997, the visits/admission ratio and
admissions/operation ratio went down. The analysis
showed that a bonus switch from one with a weaker eco-
nomic incentive to one with a stronger incentive was one
of the factors explaining the decreases in the visits/admis-
sion ratio and in the admissions/operation ratio,
suggesting there must be other factors affecting these
ratios. The number of visits to county hospitals was
increasing until around the middle of the 1980s, and then
started falling. Beginning at the end of the 1970s, rural
economic reform brought about a rapid increase in peas-
ants' income, which could have encouraged an increased
demand for health care [21]. This may have been felt par-
ticularly at higher-level health institutions, such as county
hospitals, because of the collapse of the rural Cooperative
Medical System and the decrease in the number of rural
doctors after the rural economic reform [22]. However,
the increase in the number of rural doctors after the mid-
1980s, when rural private practice was permitted, may
have pulled patients back from county hospitals. In addi-
tion, the increase at that time in the number of county
level health institutions, such as stations of maternal and
child health and hospitals of Chinese traditional medi-
cine, and the increase in medical prices, would have
decreased the demand for county hospital care.
It is difficult to explain fully the steady increase in the
number of admissions and the number of operations.
Since inpatients can be admitted only through the outpa-
tient department and only inpatients can be operated on,
it is obvious that the hospitals admitted more and more
from among the outpatients and performed more and
more operations for the inpatients. There are several pos-
sible reasons for this. First, the case mix may have changed
so that more patients needed to be admitted and operatedHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:11 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/11
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on. Second, the development of technology and changes
in medical criteria for admissions and operations may
have led to more patients' being admitted and operated
on. Third, the increase in the numbers of beds and doctors
may have permitted needed admissions and operations
that had not been possible before due to lack of inputs.
Finally, related to the major hypothesis of this research,
the changes in doctor payment system may have moti-
vated staff to provide more unnecessary admissions and
surgical operations. The study has shown that a bonus
switch appeared to bring about an increase in the visits/
admission ratio, but case notes did not permit a judge-
ment as to whether an admission was necessary or
unnecessary.
Although the DEA efficiency score decreased when panel
hospitals switched from non-bonus to flat bonus, this
does not mean that the bonus switch helped to decrease
hospital productivity. This is, first, because the DEA effi-
ciency score was generally decreasing over time; and sec-
ond, because in two of the three hospitals (Liangshan and
Changyi), the bonus switch appears to have helped to
slow down the rate of decrease in the DEA efficiency score.
Conclusions and policy implications
Based on these analyses, we can draw several conclusions.
First, there was a steady increase in hospital revenue, and
bonus type was a significant factor explaining its variation
across hospitals and years.
Second, a considerable proportion of unnecessary
expenditure out of total expenditure was identified, and
there was a relationship between the bonus system and
unnecessary care. Analyses showed that the bonus system
was positively correlated with the unnecessary care indica-
tor, implying that the higher the expected incentive of the
bonus system, the higher the proportion of unnecessary
expenditure.
Third, although hospital productivity decreased over time,
a bonus switch from flat bonus to revenue-related bonus
appeared to increase hospital productivity in the year of
the switch. A bonus switch from non-bonus to flat bonus
was not similarly able to reverse the trend of hospital pro-
ductivity, but it seemed that the rate of decrease in hospi-
tal productivity was slowed down by a bonus switch.
Fourth, hospital cost recovery increased over time. The
study suggests that the bonus switch brought about an
increase in cost recovery and that the bonus system was
positively correlated with hospital cost recovery.
Last and in general, the research suggests that the bonus
change over time contributed significantly to the increase
in hospital service revenue and hospital cost recovery. The
increase in unnecessary care and increase in the number of
admissions out of the existing number of outpatients,
with the bonus system switching from one with a weaker
incentive to one with a stronger incentive, suggests that
the improvement in hospital cost recovery was achieved at
least in part through the provision of more unnecessary
care and drugs and through admitting more patients.
There are two policy implications from this study. First,
there is little evidence that the performance-related pay
system as designed by Chinese public hospitals is socially
desirable. It could improve hospital financial sustainabil-
ity, but did not necessarily lead to improvements in effi-
ciency from a social perspective. The key barrier to
achieving the social objectives of performance-related pay
was the inappropriate link (whether direct or indirect)
between bonus payment and hospital revenue. Hospital
bonus distribution should be based on doctor perform-
ance measured by indicators that are in line with the
desired overall performance of the health care system.
Second, reforms in various countries are characterized by
increased exposure of public hospitals to financial risk, in
order to increase financial accountability, efficiency and
productivity. However there is a risk of encouraging reve-
nue maximization and rent-seeking. Chinese experiences
show that when increasing public hospital autonomy,
hospitals should be monitored closely by the government,
and regulations applied to limit opportunistic behaviour.
Otherwise, the containment of government financing to
public facilities may result in an increase in the provision
of unnecessary care, an increase in health costs to society
and a waste in social resources.
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